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Abstract
This paper estimates the impact of accounting transparency on the term
structure of CDS spreads for a large cross-section of rms. Using a newly
developed measure of accounting transparency in Berger, Chen & Li (2006),
we nd a downward-sloping term structure of transparency spreads. Esti-
mating the gap between the high and low transparency credit curves at the
1, 3, 5, 7 and 10-year maturity, the transparency spread is insignicant in the
long end but highly signicant and robust at 20 bps at the 1-year maturity.
Furthermore, the e¤ect of accounting transparency on the term structure of
CDS spreads is largest for the most risky rms. These results are strongly
supportive of the model by Du¢ e & Lando (2001), and add an explanation
to the underprediction of short-term credit spreads by traditional structural
credit risk models.
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1 Introduction
Traditional structural credit risk models originating with Black & Scholes (1973)
and Merton (1974) dene default as the rst passage of a perfectly measured asset
value to a default barrier. While later extensions that allow for endogenous default
and debt renegotiations have increased predicted spread levels, it is well-known in
the empirical literature that structural models underpredict corporate bond credit
spreads, particularly in the short end.1 Reasons for the poor performance may
lie in shortcomings in the models as well as factors other than default risk in the
corporate bond credit spread.
As noted in Du¢ e & Lando (2001), it is typically di¢ cult for investors in
the secondary credit markets to observe a rms assets directly, either because
of noisy or delayed accounting reports or other barriers to monitoring. Instead,
investors must draw inference from the available accounting data and other publicly
available information. As a consequence they build a model where credit investors
are not kept fully informed on the status of the rm, but receive noisy unbiased
estimates of the asset value at selected times. This intuitively simple framework
has a signicant implication for the term structure of credit spreads.
In particular, for rms with perfectly measured assets credit spreads are rela-
tively small at short maturities and zero at zero maturity, regardless of the riski-
ness of the rm. However, if rm assets periodically are observed with noise, credit
spreads are strictly positive under the same limit because investors are uncertain
about the distance of current assets to the default barrier.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by estimating the component
of the term structure of credit spreads associated with a lack of accounting trans-
parency.2 To this end, credit default swap (CDS) spreads at the 1, 3, 5, 7 and
10-year maturity for a large cross-section of rms are used together with a newly
developed measure of accounting transparency by Berger et al. (2006). This trans-
parency measure is related to CDS spreads in two main ways.
First, it is used to estimate a gap between the high and low transparency credit
curves. This gap interpreted as a transparency spread is estimated at 20 bps at the
1-year maturity and narrows to 14, 8, 7 and 5 bps at the 3, 5, 7 and 10-year matu-
rity, respectively. The downward-sloping term structure of transparency spreads is
1See e.g. Jones, Mason & Rosenfeld (1984), Ogden (1987), Huang & Huang (2003) and Eom,
Helwege & Huang (2004).
2Consistent with the literature, we use the terms "accounting noise" and "accounting trans-
parency" interchangeably. If the noise in the reported asset value is low, the accounting trans-
parency is high.
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highly signicant in the short end but most often insignicantly estimated above
the 5-year maturity. Furthermore, the e¤ect of accounting transparency is largest
for the most risky rms. These results are robust across alternative econometric
specications controlling for within cluster correlations and a large set of control
variables.
Second, we analyze each maturity class in isolation using the raw transparency
measure and a rank transformation. In this specication, the equal maturities
across rms xed through time in the CDS data allow the control variables to enter
nonlinearly across maturities classes. Since insights from above are preserved, the
results are supportive of hypotheses derived from Du¢ e & Lando (2001) and add
an explanation to the underprediction of short-term credit spreads by traditional
structural models.
However, the explanatory power of accounting transparency and a typical set of
control variables is small for less risky rms. This observation is supportive of the
problems in earlier studies, when explaining the credit spreads of low-yield rms
using structural models. This paper suggests that variables other than accounting
transparency are needed, also in the short end.
The results contrast an earlier study by Yu (2005), who analyzes corporate
bond credit spreads in 1991 to 1996 using the AIMR analyst ranking of corporate
disclosure. He attributes a u-shaped transparency spread with the largest a¤ect
at longer maturities to a discretionary disclosure hypothesis, where rms hide
information that would adversely a¤ect their long-term outlook. While Du¢ e
& Lando (2001) assume an exogenous unbiased accounting noise, the theory of
discretionary disclosure starting with Verrecchia (1983) suggests that withheld
information may signal hidden bad news about a company. Consistent with the
term structure implications in Du¢ e & Lando (2001), our study shows that the
transparency spread is downward-sloping in the CDS market.
Although a close relation exists between corporate bond and CDS spreads
(Du¢ e (1999)), the latter are preferable from several perspectives when analyzing
the determinants of the shape of the credit curve. First, the xed maturities in
CDS contracts make term structures directly comparable across rms and time.
There is no maturity shortening as there would be with corporate bonds, and we
are not forced to interpolate maturities to compare spreads in the cross-section.
Second, quotes at di¤erent maturities should be compared on the same curve,
and a study of multiple maturity observations for a given rm at a given date is
in e¤ect only possible in the CDS market. Third, a use of CDS spreads avoids any
noise arising from a misspecied risk-free yield curve (Houweling & Vorst (2003)).
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Fourth, as shown in Lando & Mortensen (2005) and Agrawal & Bohn (2005), the
shape of the corporate bond credit curve depends on deviations from par under
the realistic recovery of face value assumption. As Yu (2005) focuses on secondary
market yields this technical e¤ect may inuence his results. The same e¤ect is not
present in the CDS market as CDS spreads are closely related to par bond spreads.
Fifth, CDS contracts are less likely to be a¤ected by di¤erences in contractual
arrangements such as embedded options, guarantees, covenants and coupon e¤ects.
Although bonds with e.g. call features may be deliverable in default this e¤ect is
present across the entire spectrum of CDS quotes.
Sixth, several recent studies nd that CDS spreads are a purer measure of
credit risk and represent more timely information than corporate bonds. Non-
default components stemming from asymmetric taxation and illiquidity have been
compared across corporate bond and CDS markets.3 However, the component due
to imprecisely observed assets, let alone the term structure implications, is much
less understood.
A reason for the lack of evidence on the impact of accounting transparency is
the di¢ culty in constructing an empirical measure of a rms overall information
quality. The accounting literature explaining e.g. the cost of capital has relied
on the AIMR analyst ranking of corporate disclosure. Analyzing the cost of debt,
Sengupta (1998) nds a negative relationship between the AIMR measure and
o¤ering yields. This measure is also adopted by Yu (2005), with a resulting sample
almost entirely made up of investment grade rms. As the measure ends in 1996,
it cannot be related to CDS curves.
However, a newly developed measure of accounting transparency by Berger
et al. (2006) can be readily calculated for a large sample of rms. This allows
us to study a large set of credit curves across rating categories. The idea behind
the measure is that controlling for the idiosyncratic cash ow volatility, the better
a rms information quality the higher its rm-specic equity return volatility.
Berger et al. (2006) conduct several tests to assess their measure, and nd results
in accordance with intuition. Our application in the credit derivatives market
provides additional evidence to the validity of the measure.
3Blanco, Brennan & Marsh (2005) nd that the CDS market leads the corporate bond market.
Longsta¤, Mithal & Neis (2005) nd a signicant non-default related component in the corporate
bond credit spread correlated with illiquidity proxies. Ericsson, Reneby & Wang (2006) nd this
not to be present in CDSs. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal & Mann (2001) document a tax premium of
29 to 73 percent of the corporate bond credit spread, depending on the rating. Related studies
on corporate bonds include Delianedis & Geske (2001) and Huang & Huang (2003).
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This paper is related to Sarga & Warga (1989), Fons (1994), Helwege & Turner
(1999), Lando & Mortensen (2005) and Agrawal & Bohn (2005) who analyze the
slope of the credit curve as a function of credit quality. Ignoring noisy asset reports,
standard theory predicts an upward-sloping credit curve for high quality rms
and a humped shaped or mostly downward-sloping credit curve for low quality
rms. However, these papers are silent on decomposing the curve and the e¤ect
of accounting transparency.
Early studies mainly analyze the 5-year maturity, which is considered the most
liquid point on the curve. This paper contributes to an increasing literature ana-
lyzing the entire term structure of CDS spreads. In addition to Lando &Mortensen
(2005) and Agrawal & Bohn (2005) this includes Huang & Zhou (2007), who con-
duct a consistent specication analysis of traditional structural models. Although
the 5-year maturity dominates our data, a signicant number of observations are
found at the 1, 3, 7 and 10-year maturity.
Finally, the paper is related to studies on the determinants of credit spreads
such as Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein & Martin (2001), Campbell & Taksler (2003),
Ericsson, Jacobs & Oviedo (2005), Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout & Weinbaum
(2006) and Cao, Yu & Zhong (2006). These papers analyze the explanatory power
of traditional structural variables such as leverage, asset volatility and risk-free
interest rates, but are silent on di¤erent maturity classes and accounting trans-
parency. Finally, Güntay & Hackbarth (2007) study the relation between corporate
bond credit spreads and the dispersion of equity analystsearnings forecasts.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the Du¢ e & Lando
(2001) model and motivate the hypotheses. This section also shows a formula
for the CDS spread that avoids a double integral and is easily comparable with
the case of perfect information. Section 3 outlines the accounting transparency
measure developed in Berger et al. (2006), while section 4 presents the data. The
descriptive statistics are presented in section 5, while section 6 and 7 contain the
empirical results and a robustness analysis. Section 8 concludes. Appendix A
and B give details behind the Du¢ e & Lando (2001) model and the transparency
measure, respectively.
2 Hypotheses
In traditional structural credit risk models, default is dened as the rst hitting
time of a perfectly observed di¤usion process on a default barrier. This default
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barrier can be exogenously determined as in e.g. Black & Cox (1976) and Longsta¤
& Schwartz (1995) or endogenously derived as in e.g. Leland (1994) and Leland
& Toft (1996).
As shown in Leland (2004), these models do a reasonable job in predicting
longer horizon default rates while the prediction of short-term default rates is
far to low. The problem is that conditional on the rm value being above the
barrier, the probability that it will cross the barrier in the next t is o(t) and
the conditional default probability converges to zero as time goes to zero.
Du¢ e & Lando (2001) argue that it is typically di¢ cult for investors in the
secondary credit markets to perfectly observe the rms assets and introduce ac-
counting noise into a Leland (1994)-type model. More specically, the value of the
rms assets is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion unobservable to
the credit investors. Instead, the rm periodically issues noisy unbiased account-
ing reports, which makes investors uncertain about the distance of the assets to
the default barrier.
Conditional on the accounting reports and the fact that the rm has not de-
faulted investors are able to compute a distribution of the value of assets. This
conditional distribution of assets is reproduced in Figure 1 for various degrees of
accounting noise a and a set of base case parameters. The crucial parameter a
measures the standard deviation of the normal noise-term added to the true as-
set value. A lower a thus represents a higher degree of accounting transparency
and less uncertainty about the true asset value. When a approaches zero the
distribution will eventually collapse around the latest reported asset value.
According to Du¢ e & Lando (2001) this simple mechanism of uncertainty
surrounding the true asset value is enough to produce a default probability within
the next t that is O(t). In fact, they show that as time goes to zero the limit
of the conditional default probability is the intensity of the default stopping time
 . The Du¢ e & Lando (2001) model is further described in appendix A.
The payments in a CDS t nicely into a continuous-time framework since the
accrued premium must also be paid if a credit event occurs between two payment
dates. In appendix A we show that with continuous payments the CDS spread
with maturity T can be written as












where r is the risk-free interest rate and R is the recovery rate.4  (T; x  )
denotes the probability of rst passage time of a Brownian motion with constant
drift and volatility parameter from an initial condition (x  ) > 0 to a level
below zero at time T , where x and  denote the logarithm of the asset value and
default barrier, respectively. The formulas for  (T; x  ) and G(x; T ) are given
in closed form in the appendix together with the conditional density function of
the logarithm of assets g (x) at the time of issuance of the CDS.
In the case of perfect information the integral and the density function g (x)
simply disappears, leading to a closed form solution for the CDS spread known
from traditional structural credit risk models.
In Figure 2, the term structure of CDS spreads in equation (1) is shown for the
associated conditional distribution of assets in Figure 1 and the various degrees
of accounting noise a. Also depicted is the traditional case of perfect information
a = 0, where the spread approaches zero as maturity goes to zero. However,
this is not the case when noisy reports are introduced. As a becomes larger, the
probability that the asset value is, in fact, close to the default barrier and may cross
in a short period of time increases, resulting in higher short-term spreads. The
di¤erence in spreads due to a lack of accounting transparency is less pronounced
at longer maturities.
Figure 3 and 4 depict the case of a lower leverage and a lower asset volatility,
respectively. This captures the e¤ect of accounting transparency on CDS spreads
for less risky rms than the base case. The spreads are compressed compared to
Figure 2, indicating that we should expect a lower absolute e¤ect of accounting
transparency for less risky rms.
Finally, an adverse e¤ect of the exogenous and unbiased accounting noise in
the Du¢ e & Lando (2001) model, which is also addressed in Yu (2005), is depicted
in Figure 5. In this case, the current report shows a substantially lower asset value
than the lagged report, which leads to the counterintuitive result that a higher
transparency is associated with higher spreads for most parts of the term structure.
With perfect information the lagged report is irrelevant, but as a increases and
transparency is reduced the current report becomes less reliable and more weight
is put on the lagged report suggesting a higher asset value.5 Hence, more mass of
the conditional asset distribution is shifted towards higher asset values implying
4The formula in Du¢ e & Lando (2001) is based on semiannually payments and a double
integral over time and the asset density. The assumption of continuous payments implies that it
is only necessary to calculate a single integral numerically to evaluate the CDS spread.
5Under perfect information, the term-structure of CDS spreads in Figure 2 and 5 are identical.
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lower credit spreads.
This example illustrates the need for structural models to incorporate account-
ing transparency as an endogenous choice. With discretionary disclosure this situ-
ation would not arise since the rm would choose not to reveal the bad news in the
rst place. The theory of discretionary disclosure starting with Verrecchia (1983)
suggests that withheld information may signal hidden bad news about a company.
As a result, a lower transparency is associated with higher credit spreads.
[Figures 1,2,3,4 and 5 about here ]
The above intuition leads to the following hypotheses for the qualitative e¤ect
of accounting transparency on CDS spreads.
H1. Firms with a lower level of accounting transparency have higher CDS
spreads.
H2. The e¤ect of accounting transparency is more pronounced at shorter
maturities, leading to a term structure e¤ect.
H3. A stronger e¤ect of accounting transparency is expected for more risky
rms.
The rst hypothesis is due to the theory of discretionary disclosure, while the
second and third are due to Du¢ e & Lando (2001). At reasonable parameter
values, Du¢ e & Lando (2001) do not predict a signicant spread due to noisy
reports above the 5-year maturity.
The term structure e¤ect of discretionary disclosure is less obvious and depends
on the nature of information that a rm tries to conceal. A temporary shock to the
rm value a¤ects short-term spreads, while a permanent shock such as a negative
outlook on earnings growth a¤ects long-term spreads. Yu (2005) notes that the
positive net-worth requirement e¤ectively present in short-term debt implies that
rms have little incentive to conceal information that they are soon forced to reveal
anyway.6 Hence, he argues that discretionary disclosure is most likely to concern
permanent shocks and long-term spreads.
3 Measuring Accounting Transparency
To assess accounting transparency, we construct a newly developed measure by
Berger et al. (2006) that can be readily calculated for a large sample rms. The
6See Leland (1994) for the relationship between short-term debt and positive net-worth re-
quirements.
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idea behind the measure is that when pricing equity, investors use a weighted
average of reported earnings and industry earnings. Investors put more weight on
the rms reported earnings when the accounting transparency is high. It turns out
that the measure of accounting transparency is the ratio of idiosyncratic equity
return volatility to the idiosyncratic volatility in earnings growth. Appendix B
establishes the theoretical link between the measure and accounting transparency.
The current section implements it as prescribed in Berger et al. (2006).
In particular, to measure transparency empirically in year t two regressions are
performed. The rst uses monthly data from year t   5 to t   1 to calculate the














where rjt is rm j
0s monthly equity return, rMt is the CRSP value-weighted market
return and rIt is a value-weighted industry return using the 48 industries in Fama
& French (1997).7 To ensure the accuracy at least 50 valid monthly returns are
required for each rm. The annualized idiosyncratic volatility of returns IV OLrt;j
is then calculated as
p
12  std("r;j).
The second regression uses quarterly data from year t  5 to t  1 to calculate














where EGjt is the annual growth rate in rm j
0s quarterly operating earnings
calculated as operating earningstoperating earningst 4 1.
8 The growth rate is measured between identical
quarters to avoid complications that arise from seasonality. If the lagged earnings
are negative the growth rate is not meaningful and that particular growth rate is
dropped.9 To ensure the accuracy, we require at least 15 quarters of data. EGMt
is the earnings-weighted average market growth rate and EGIt is the earnings-
weighted average growth rate in the Fama & French (1997) industries.
The idiosyncratic volatility in earnings growth IV OLEGt;j is std("
EG;j), and the
measure is nally constructed as the ratio of the idiosyncratic volatility in equity
7Market capitalization is used as weights when calculating the market and industry returns.
All rms in the CRSP database enter the return and later earnings growth calculations.
8The quarterly operating earnings is data item number 8 in the Compustat database.
9Since operating income and not net income is used the loss of observations is small.
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Hence, the idiosyncratic volatility in equity returns is driven by the idiosyn-
cratic volatility in earnings growth and the rms information quality. The measure
is theoretically constrained to the unit interval, and a higher score corresponds to
a higher accounting transparency.
Berger et al. (2006) calculate the measure for 41,615 rm-years in 1980 to 2004
and nd empirical evidence in accordance with intuition and theory. In particular,
they assess the validity of the measure by relating it to di¤erent measures of
disclosure quality and the cost of equity. First, the measure increased after two
new regulations that increased mandatory disclosures in the pension and oil and
gas sectors. Second, the measure is strongly correlated with the investor relations
component of the AIMR measure and weakly correlated with the total AIMR
measure. Third, rms with a higher measure are followed by more analysts and
have a lower forecast dispersion of earnings per share. Finally, the measure is
negatively related to three estimates of the cost of equity.
In the end, we necessarily test the joint hypotheses of the validity of the ac-
counting transparency measure developed in Berger et al. (2006), and the term
structure e¤ects suggested in Du¢ e & Lando (2001). Our application in the credit
derivatives market provides additional evidence to the validity of the measure.
4 Data
Data on CDS spreads is provided by the ValuSpread database from Lombard Risk
Systems, dating back to July 1999. The number of entities and frequency of quotes
increase signicantly through time, reecting the growth and improved liquidity
in the market. This data is also used by Lando & Mortensen (2005) and Berndt,
Jarrow & Kang (2006). The data consists of mid-market CDS quotes on both
sovereigns and corporates with varying maturity, restructuring clause, seniority
and currency. For a given date, reference entity and contract specication, the
database reports a composite CDS quote together with an intra-daily standard
deviation of the collected quotes. The composite quote is calculated as a mid-
market quote by obtaining quotes from up to 25 leading market makers. This
o¤ers a more reliable measure of the market spread than using a single source, and
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the standard deviation measures how representative the mid-market quote is for
the overall market.
To test the e¤ect of accounting transparency on the term structure of CDS
spreads, contracts with a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years are analyzed. We
furthermore conne ourselves to composite CDS quotes on senior unsecured debt
for North American corporate obligors with currencies denominated in US dol-
lars. Regarding the specication of the credit event, we follow large parts of the
literature in using contracts with a modied restructuring clause.
To generate a proper subsample, several lters are applied to the data. First,
the CDS data is merged with quarterly balance sheet data from Compustat and
daily stock market data from CRSP. The quarterly balance sheet data is lagged
one month from the end of the quarter to avoid the look-ahead bias in using data
not yet available in the market. Second, rms from the nancial and utility sector
are excluded.
Third, the composite quote at a given maturity must have a certain quality.
Therefore, we dene the relative quote dispersion as the intra-daily standard de-
viation of collected quotes divided by the mid-market quote. We follow Lando
& Mortensen (2005) and delete all daily mid-market quotes with an intra-daily
quote dispersion of zero or above 20 percent. Fourth, 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10-year con-
stant maturity treasury yields are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.
Fifth, we restrict the sample to end-of-month dates. This selection criteria
is also applied by Lando & Mortensen (2005), as these dates have the highest
number of quotes. This leaves us with 31,525 month-end consensus quotes dis-
tributed across 8,309 curves and 432 rms. Finally, the dataset is merged with
the annual transparency measure calculated for each rm in section 3. The re-
sult is 25,599 month-end quotes distributed across 6,756 curves, 368 rms and 890
rm-years from May 2002 to September 2004, with su¢ cient data to calculate the
transparency measure developed in Berger et al. (2006).10
5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of the annual accounting transparency measure.
Panel A represents statistics based on the pooled measure across rms and years,
10One rm is excluded, Colgate Palmolive, as the transparency measure is calculated at 10.23,
11.56 and 11.89 in year 2002-2004. This persistently large score far above the remaining rms
might indicate a data problem specic to the rm.
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while statistics in Panel B are calculated after averaging the measure for each rm
in the time-series. The pooled mean and median are 0.50 and 0.29, respectively.
A few high transparency scores drive up the average, and about 10 percent of the
sample rm-years have scores larger than the theoretical upper bound of 1. A
similar result based on a larger set of rms is found in Berger et al. (2006), who
attribute it to possible time-varying expected returns.
The standard deviation is 0.61 and the inter-quartile range is 0.44. The same
variation is observed in panel B after averaging the measure in the time-series,
indicating a large variation in accounting transparency across the rms. The data
allow for a maximum of 3 consecutive annual transparency scores with associated
CDS data for each rm. An untabulated mean and median annual absolute change
of 0.17 and 0.04, respectively, indicate a somewhat persistent transparency measure
in the time-series.
[Table 1 about here ]
Table 2 presents summary statistics of key variables across the senior unsecured
credit rating from Standard & Poors. The variables presented are averages across
time and across rms. Consistent with the predictions of structural credit risk
models, a lower rating is associated with a higher credit spread level represented
by the 5-year CDS spread, a higher equity volatility and a higher leverage. The
equity volatility is calculated using 250 days of equity returns, and leverage is total
liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and equity market capitalization.
[Table 2 about here ]
A better credit rating is associated with a higher accounting transparency. This
observation and a correlation of 0.16 in Table 3 provide additional evidence to the
validity of the transparency measure as documented empirically in Berger et al.
(2006). As noted in Sengupta (1998) and Yu (2005), credit agencies claim to have
incorporated the quality of information disclosure in the credit ratings. Hence,
we follow Sengupta (1998) and Yu (2005) and use credit ratings with caution
when controlling for the cross-sectional determinants of credit spreads other than
accounting transparency. We use an alternative set of control variables from studies
on the determinants of credit spreads such as equity volatility, leverage, liquidity
and the risk-free yield curve. However, we also analyze whether credit ratings
absorb the e¤ect of accounting transparency on the term structure of CDS spreads.
As a nal remark, the correlation between the accounting transparency measure
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and leverage and volatility, respectively, is estimated at -0.16 and -0.08. This is
of similar sign and magnitude as the correlations found in Yu (2005) based on the
AIMR measure in 1991 to 1996.
[Table 3 about here ]
The distribution of the CDS spreads across credit ratings and maturities is
illustrated in Table 4 Panel A. The mean consensus quote across time and rms is
found in the rst row, while the number of observations and the mean relative quote
dispersion are found in the second and third row, respectively. Panel B contains the
statistics for full month-end curves with observations at all maturities at month-
end for a given rm. By considering full curves, the mean consensus quotes within a
given rating class are comparable across maturities, since all averages are calculated
from the same set of dates and rms. As expected, the mean consensus quotes
increase monotonically with maturity for high credit quality rms and decrease
monotonically with maturity for the lowest credit quality rms.11
The 5-year maturity accounts for the highest number of observations, but even
the least observed 1-year maturity accounts for almost 15 percent of the observa-
tions. Across ratings the lower end of the investment grade segment has the highest
number of observations. However, we are able to study a signicant proportion of
sample spreads across maturities in the low credit quality segment. For BB-rated
rms the sample consists of 449 to 757 month-end quotes for each maturity and
342 full curves, while the number of quotes for B-rated rms ranges from 66 to 87
with 50 full curves.12
Lando & Mortensen (2005) interpret the relative quote dispersion as a proxy
for liquidity. The more agreement about a quote, the higher the liquidity for that
particular credit. Adopting this liquidity proxy, we see a liquidity smile for a xed
rating across maturities. This is consistent with the fact that the 5-year maturity
is considered the most liquid point on the curve. However, the di¤erence in the
mean relative quote dispersion across maturities is small.
[Table 4 about here ]
11Theory predicts an upward-sloping credit curve for high quality rms and a humped shaped
or mostly downward-sloping credit curve for low quality rms. While the rst is well-established
in the empirical literature, the latter is more controversial. See Sarga & Warga (1989), Fons
(1994), Helwege & Turner (1999), Lando & Mortensen (2005) and Agrawal & Bohn (2005).
12For comparison, Yu (2005) studies 0 speculative grade bonds in 1991-1994, 4 in 1995 and 15
in 1996.
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In the end, the measure developed in Berger et al. (2006) allows us to relate
accounting transparency to CDS curves for a large cross-section of rms. Im-
portantly, the distribution of CDS spread observations across credit quality and
maturity is desirable in our attempt to understand the impact of accounting trans-
parency on the term structure of CDS spreads. The accounting transparency varies
considerably in the large cross-section but less in our relatively short time-series.
Furthermore, some evidence indicates that credit spread changes in the time-series
are mostly driven by market factors that tend to overwhelm the e¤ect of rm-level
characteristics.13 Hence, cross-sectional regressions form our benchmark approach.
This makes the results comparable to Yu (2005), as cross-sectional regressions
constitute the only regression framework in his study. Later, various econometric
specications are introduced to ensure that the results are not driven by spurious
correlations.
6 Empirical Results
First, we estimate a gap between the high and low transparency credit curves.
This allows us to directly estimate the term structure of transparency spreads.
We then study a restricted set of full curves and estimate the transparency spread
term structure for high and low risk rms.
6.1 The Term Structure of Transparency Spreads
Du¢ e & Lando (2001) predict accounting transparency to be an important variable
in explaining credit spreads in the short end. At reasonable parameter values, the
model does not predict a signicant impact of accounting transparency above the
5-year maturity. However, discretionary disclosure may still imply an e¤ect in the
long end.
The corporate bond data used in Yu (2005) consists of bonds with unequal
and shortening maturities and durations. This forces him to construct a piecewise
linear function of bond maturity across the rms at each month-end. He then
estimates the level of the credit spread at the constructed and articial knot points.
As a starting point, we adopt a comparable specication and estimate the gap
13The results in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) suggest that the time-series variation in corporate
bond credit spreads is mainly determined by local supply and demand shocks independent of
credit risk factors and liquidity proxies. Huang & Zhou (2007) nd that ve popular structural
models cannot capture the time-series behavior of CDS spreads.
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between the high and low transparency credit curves. However, we estimate the
gap between the two curves at the equal, xed and therefore directly comparable
maturities in the CDS data, and interpret the gap as a transparency spread term
structure.
In particular, dene d as a dummy variable that equals 1 if a rms transparency
measure calculated in equation (4) in a given year ranks above the median score.
Furthermore, dene mT as a variable that attains a value of 1 if the CDS spread
has a maturity of T = 1, 3 if the CDS spread has a maturity of T = 3 and so
forth. Hence, in the linear combination 1m1+ 2m3+ 3m5+ 4m7+ 5m10 the
coe¢ cient i represents the level of the term structure at maturities 1, 3, 5, 7 and
10 years. Now, dene dmT as the product of the transparency dummy d and mT .
The regression coe¢ cient in front of this term can be directly interpreted as the
transparency spread, i.e. the gap between the high and low transparency credit
curves at the given maturity.
Hence, we run monthly cross-sectional regressions of CDS spreads on the trans-
parency variables, volatility, leverage and relative quote dispersion14
Spreadit = 1tm1it + 2tm3it + 3tm5it + 4tm7it + 5tm10it (5)
+6tdm1it + 7tdm3it + 8tdm5it + 9tdm7it + 10tdm10it
+11tV olit + 12tLevit + 13tQdispit + "it:
The coe¢ cient estimates are averaged in the time-series and standard errors
are calculated following Fama & MacBeth (1973). Table 5 displays the results.
Focusing on the rst column, the transparency spread is highly signicant and
estimated at 23 bps at the 1-year maturity and 20, 13, 13 and 11 bps at the
remaining maturities. Particularly the transparency spread in the short end repre-
sents a considerable part of the average CDS spread level of 130 to 140 bps across
maturities as reported in Table 4.
As expected, the volatility and leverage are highly signicant in explaining
credit spreads. However, the relative quote dispersion varies in signicance and has
a negative coe¢ cient estimate. If proxying for liquidity, the coe¢ cient is expected
to be positive. Hence, although the variable allows for reasonable interpretations
on average as liquidity in Table 4, it is questionable whether the relative quote
dispersion captures di¤erences in liquidity as suggested in Lando & Mortensen
(2005). As the control variable only has a minor impact on the remaining coe¢ cient
14To facilitate interpretation the regression equation does not include an intercept term. Hence,
the R2 is not reported under this empirical specication.
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estimates and signicance, we keep it in our future regressions.15
Firms usually have corporate bonds outstanding with just a few (or one) matu-
rities. Hence, studying multiple maturity observations for a given rm at a given
date is in e¤ect only possible in the CDS market, and therefore not pursued in
Yu (2005). Table 5 also contains the regression results for a restricted set of full
month-end curves with observations at all maturities at month-end for a given rm.
This makes CDS spreads directly comparable across maturities as all observations
are from the same set of dates and rms. As noted in Helwege & Turner (1999)
and Lando & Mortensen (2005), rms with heterogenous credit quality are known
to populate di¤erent ends of the corporate bond credit curve. This maturity bias
is avoided when studying full curves in the CDS market.
A highly signicant downward-sloping term structure of transparency spreads
also emerges from a study of full curves. From a transparency spread of 24 bps at
the 1-year maturity it decreases to 13 bps at the longest maturity.
[Table 5 about here ]
The results in Table 5 to some extend support the ndings in Yu (2005). While
agreeing on the statistically and economically signicant transparency spread in
the short end, Yu (2005) nds a widening transparency spread at longer maturities.
In fact, he nds the transparency spread larger in the long end than short end.
He attributes this observation to the discretionary disclosure hypothesis where
rms hide information that would adversely a¤ect their long-term outlook.16 In
alternative econometric specications building on the interpretation of dmT as a
transparency spread, we later show that the term structure of transparency spreads
is not only strictly downward-sloping but most often insignicant in the long end.
As argued in section 2, a stronger e¤ect of accounting transparency is expected
for more risky rms. Therefore, each month the rms are separated into high and
low leverage and volatility groups by the respective medians. The regression in (5)
is then presented for each group in Table 6.17
15Unreported results show that the presence or omission of relative quote dispersion has no
impact on any results reported in the paper.
16Although Yu (2005) has only few observations in the longest end, he calculates a transparency
spread at the 30-year knot point coinciding with the maximum corporate bond maturity. Hence,
this estimate is likely to be less reliable. However, while our transparency spread term-structure
remains downward-sloping, his exhibits a u-shape already at the 10-year knot point. More
precisely, he estimates a transparency spread of 11, 3, 9 and 13 bps at the 0, 5, 10 and 30-year
knot points.
17As noted in Table 3, the correlation between the transparency measure and leverage and
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For the low leverage and low volatility groups, the e¤ect of accounting trans-
parency on credit spreads is small and of varying signicance. While the trans-
parency spread term structure is insignicantly estimated for low leverage rms,
it is most often signicant for the low volatility rms. However, the transparency
spread is estimated at around 3 to 7 bps, which constitutes a small part of the
average CDS spread level for low volatility rms of 69 to 84 bps across maturities.
In contrast, the e¤ect of accounting transparency is large for the high leverage
and high volatility groups. For the high leverage group the term structure of
transparency spreads is highly signicant and estimated at 29, 34, 23, 22 and 14
bps across maturities. For the high volatility group it is estimated at 33, 26, 14,
12 and 7 bps. The transparency spread is highly signicant in the short end while
insignicantly estimated at longer maturities.
Finally, for rms with both a high leverage and a high volatility, the term
structure of transparency spreads is very steep and estimated at 51, 40, 23, 22 and
15 bps. Again, the transparency spread is highly signicant in the short end while
weakly signicant at the longest maturity. Compared to an average spread of 180
to 220 bps across maturities in both groups, the transparency spread constitutes
a relatively larger component of the CDS spread level for risky rms. Unreported
results on full curves support these insights.
[Table 6 about here ]
To summarize at this point, we nd a highly signicant downward-sloping term
structure of transparency spreads. Furthermore, the e¤ect of accounting trans-
parency on the term structure of CDS spreads is largest for the most risky rms.
We now show that the term structure of transparency spreads remains downward-
sloping under alternative econometric specications. Furthermore, while highly
signicant in the short end, it is often insignicant at maturities exceeding 5 years.
These ndings are in line with the hypotheses derived from Du¢ e & Lando (2001).
volatility, respectively, is -0.16 and -0.08. As an extreme example, all rms with below median
leverage or volatility could have above median accounting transparency. In such a case, the
regression would not be able to identify a relation between transparency and CDS spreads.
However, the summary statistics on accounting transparency for each high and low leverage or
volatility group are not far from those reported in Table 1.
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7 Robustness Analysis
This section conducts various robustness tests, e.g. controlling for a residual de-
pendence across a given credit curve. Finally, the equal maturities across rms
xed through time in the CDS data allow the control variables to impact CDS
spreads nonlinearly across maturities in a nal specication. This exercise can be
based on the raw transparency measure and a rank transformation.
7.1 Alternative Econometric Specications
Table 7 presents the results of estimating the gap between the high and low trans-
parency credit curves under di¤erent econometric specications. The benchmark
regression (1) is a pooled OLS regression with White standard errors. As standard
errors in the remaining regressions are robust to heteroscedasticity, di¤erences in
standard errors across columns (1) to (8) are due to within cluster correlations -
including the Fama & MacBeth (1973) standard errors in (7) and (8).18
Clustered standard errors (also called Rogers standard errors) account for a
residual dependence created by a rm e¤ect, time e¤ect or similar. The correlation
can be of any form as no parametric structure is assumed. Regression (2) controls
for a possible correlation in residuals across maturities for a given rm and month,
by allowing for within cluster correlation at the curve level. The clustered standard
errors in regression (3) control for a possible time e¤ect, where the residuals of a
given month may be correlated across di¤erent rms and maturities.
Regression (4) to (6) extend these specications and control for a constant time
e¤ect. We do that by addressing the latter parametrically using monthly dummies.
Clustering by month while including monthly dummies allows one to separate the
time e¤ect into a constant and non-constant part. A non-constant time e¤ect is
present, if a shock in a given month has a di¤erent e¤ect on di¤erent rms.
The cross-sectional Fama & MacBeth (1973) regression from Table 5 is re-
peated in regression (7). This regression also accounts for a cross-correlation in
residuals stemming from a time e¤ect, and it assumes that the monthly coe¢ cient
estimates are independent of each other. However, when estimating the standard
error of their mean the annual accounting transparency measure may imply a serial
correlation in the monthly coe¢ cient estimates. We adopt the method in Abar-
banell & Bernard (2000) and present the adjusted standard errors in regression
(8). This adjustment is designed to correct for a rm e¤ect arising from persistent
18See the survey of panel data methods used in nance by Petersen (2007).
18
rm characteristics.1920
The conclusion from Table 7 Panel A is that the transparency spread is very
robust in the short end and estimated around 20 bps at the 1-year maturity. At
longer maturities the transparency spread narrows and is estimated around 14, 8, 7
and 5 bps at the 3, 5, 7 and 10-year maturity, respectively. While highly signicant
in the short end across all specications, the transparency spread is most often
insignicantly estimated after the 7-year maturity. The same conclusion results
from Panel B, where the di¤erent econometric specications are applied on full
curves.21
[Table 7 about here ]
Table 8 repeats the specications in Table 7, but includes the senior unsecured
credit rating from Standard & Poors as an additional control variable in equation
(5). As noted in Sengupta (1998) and Yu (2005), credit agencies claim to have
incorporated the quality of information disclosure in the credit ratings. The results
show that credit ratings do not absorb the e¤ect of accounting transparency on
the term structure of credit spreads. After accounting for the information content
in credit ratings, the transparency spread continues to be highly signicant at the
1-year maturity and downward-sloping. However, now the gap between the high
and low transparency credit curves is insignicant after the 5-year maturity. As
expected, the credit rating is highly signicant and a one notch increase in rating
lowers the CDS spread by approximately 50 bps. Unreported results based on full
curves support these ndings.
[Table 8 about here ]
Consistent with empirical ndings in Du¤ee (1998), structural models such as
Longsta¤ & Schwartz (1995) predict an inverse relationship between the risk-free
19To be conservative, the adjustment is not applied when the estimated serial correlation is
less than zero.
20We do not report standard errors after clustering at the rm level or introducing rm dum-
mies for a number of reasons. First, the short time-series implies that we only have 1 year of
data for a signicant number of rms (as noted in Table 1 the data consists of 368 rms and 890
rm-years in 2002 to 2004). This makes an identication of a rm e¤ect separate from account-
ing transparency impossible. Second, as shown in Petersen (2007) the bias from a rm e¤ect
is increasing in the number of periods. Third, the inclusion of rm xed e¤ects would force an
identication of the transparency spread from time-series changes in accounting transparency,
which is unreasonable.
21Other unreported specications such as purely cross-sectional regressions and annual cross-
sectional regressions based on the time-series average CDS spreads and control variables support
these ndings.
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rate and credit spreads. An increase in the risk-free rate increases the risk-neutral
drift of the asset value process and reduces the risk-neutral default probability. If
an increase in the slope of the risk-free yield curve increases the expected future
short rate, then by the same argument as above it implies a decrease in credit
spreads. From a di¤erent perspective, as noted in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), a
decrease in the slope of the risk-free yield curve may imply a weakening economy
with decreasing expected recovery rates and higher default rates. Once again,
a negative relationship between the slope of the risk-free yield curve and credit
spreads is expected.
The risk-free term structure variables are constant across all rms in a given
month. Hence, they cannot be included in the empirical specications from Table
7 based on Fama & MacBeth (1973) or when including monthly dummies. Table
9 presents the results from including the slope of the yield curve in addition to
credit ratings in equation (5). The slope is dened as the di¤erence between the
10 and 1-year constant maturity treasury yields.22 The slope of the risk-free yield
curve is highly signicant and estimated with a negative coe¢ cient. However, the
transparency spread continues to be highly signicant in the short end, downward-
sloping and insignicant after the 5-year maturity.
[Table 9 about here ]
7.2 Individual Maturity Classes
When included in equation (5), the control variables are only allowed to induce a
parallel shift in the term structure of CDS spreads. As a nal exercise, we allow the
control variables to impact CDS spreads nonlinearly across maturities. For that
purpose, we analyze each maturity class in isolation using the raw transparency
measure calculated in equation (4) and a rank transformation. This is possible
since the data consists of CDS spreads with equal and xed maturities.
For each maturity class, Table 10 Panel A presents the results of monthly
cross-sectional regressions of CDS spreads on the transparency measure, volatility,
leverage and relative quote dispersion
Spreadit = 0t + 1tTranspit + 2tV olit + 3tLevit + 4tQdispit + "it: (6)
22The level of the risk-free yield curve is discussed in section 7.2, where individual maturity
classes are studied.
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The coe¢ cient estimates are averaged in the time-series and standard errors
are calculated following Fama & MacBeth (1973). The average adjusted R2 ranges
from 0.58 to 0.60 and accounting transparency is signicant or highly signicant at
all maturities. From a coe¢ cient of -13.45 at the 1-year maturity, the coe¢ cient on
accounting transparency decreases to -6.75 and -6.68 at the 3 and 5-year maturity,
respectively. After this point a u-shape kicks in with coe¢ cients of -8.49 and
-9.56 at the 7 and 10-year maturity, respectively. The variation in accounting
transparency in each maturity class is similar to the variation reported in Table 1
for the entire sample. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in transparency
reduces the spread by approximately 8, 4, 4, 5 and 6 bps across the curve.
Table 10 Panel B contains the regression results for the restricted set of full
curves with observations at all maturities at month-end for a given rm. The re-
sulting coe¢ cients on accounting transparency are all highly signicant and larger
at -22.28, -21.32, -19.75, -12.15 and -17.90 at maturities of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years,
respectively. A one standard deviation increase in transparency reduces the spread
by approximately 14, 13, 12, 7 and 11 bps across the curve, and main insights from
the unrestricted curves in Panel A are preserved. Under alternative econometric
specications and a broader set of control variables, the impact of accounting
transparency is later shown to strictly decrease with maturity.
[Table 10 about here ]
A concern is that the accounting transparency measure is a noisy estimate of
"true" accounting transparency, where an interpretation of the distance between
two scores in a cardinal manner is unreasonable. Hence, we transform the annual
accounting transparency measure to evenly spaced observations on the unit interval
[0,1], and only interpret the annual ranking ordinally. A transformed score of 1(0)
in a given year is assigned to the rm with highest(lowest) transparency.
Table 11 Panel A presents highly signicant coe¢ cient estimates of -36.69, -
27.73, -20.11, -26.93 and -26.89 across the curve. If a rm is able to improve its
accounting transparency from the lowest to a median ranking, say, the result is
a reduction in CDS spreads of 18, 14, 10, 13 and 13 bps at maturities of 1, 3, 5,
7 and 10 years, respectively. A similar conclusion is reached from full curves in
Panel B.
[Table 11 about here ]
Table 12 analyzes the impact of accounting transparency for high and low risk
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rms using the annual transparency ranks. Consistent with the results in the
previous section, the e¤ect of accounting transparency is small and most often
insignicant when based on rms with a low leverage and a low volatility in Panel
B. However, for the most risky rms with a high leverage and a high volatility
in Panel A, the coe¢ cient estimates are -99.02, -83.78, -68.09, -70.84 and -66.29
and highly signicant. Hence, if a risky rm is able to improve its accounting
transparency from the lowest to a median ranking, say, the result is a reduction in
CDS spreads of 50, 42, 34, 35 and 33 bps at maturities of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years,
respectively.
Note the large R2 of 0.59 to 0.63 for the risky rms and the much smaller R2 of
0.14 to 0.20 for the rms with low leverage and low volatility. This observation is
supportive of the problems in earlier studies when explaining the credit spreads of
low-yield rms using structural models. This paper suggests that variables other
than accounting transparency are needed - also in the short end.
[Table 12 about here ]
Finally, we allow the broader set of control variables to enter nonlinearly across
the curve under the alternative econometric specications introduced earlier.23
The conclusion is a downward-sloping impact of accounting transparency across
maturities that is highly robust in the short end. Across all specications, a move
from the lowest to a median transparency ranking, say, reduces the 1-year spread
by approximately 15 bps.
In particular, Table 13 presents the results from including the credit rating as a
control variable. In the cross-sectional regressions in Panel A and B, the coe¢ cients
on accounting transparency are insignicant or only weakly signicant after the
5-year maturity. The remaining specications in Panel C to F support a highly
signicant e¤ect of accounting transparency at the 1-year maturity and a declining
coe¢ cient with varying signicance at longer maturities. The credit rating is highly
signicant in all specications, and R2 increases to 0.68 compared to an R2 around
0.60 without credit ratings in the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions in Table
10.
[Table 13 about here ]
Table 14 presents the results from including the slope of the yield curve in
23As each maturity class is analyzed in isolation, the various econometric specications do not
include standard errors robust to within cluster correlation at the curve level.
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addition to credit ratings.24 As before, this variable can only be included in a
subset of the empirical specications. While estimated with a highly signicant
negative coe¢ cient, the slope of the yield curve only increases R2 marginally.
Accounting transparency continues to be highly signicant in the short end, and
the impact continues to decline as maturity increases.
[Table 14 about here ]
8 Conclusion
Motivated by the theoretical contribution in Du¢ e & Lando (2001), this paper
relates a newly developed empirical measure of accounting transparency by Berger
et al. (2006) to the term structure of CDS spreads for a large cross-section of rms.
We nd a highly signicant e¤ect of accounting transparency at the 1-year
maturity, and a declining impact at longer maturities. Estimating the gap between
the high and low transparency credit curves, the transparency spread is estimated
around 20 bps at the 1-year maturity. At longer maturities, the transparency
spread narrows and is estimated at 14, 8, 7 and 5 bps at the 3, 5, 7 and 10-
year maturity, respectively. While highly signicant in the short end and robust
across alternative econometric specications and control variables, the impact of
accounting transparency is not robust and most often insignicantly estimated for
maturities exceeding 5 years. Finally, the e¤ect of accounting transparency on the
term structure of CDS spreads is largest for the most risky rms.
These results are strongly supportive of the hypotheses derived from Du¢ e &
Lando (2001), and add an explanation to the underprediction of short-term credit
spreads by traditional structural credit risk models.
The results contrast an earlier study by Yu (2005), who analyzes corporate
bond credit spreads using the AIMR analyst ranking of corporate disclosure in
1991 to 1996. He attributes a strongly u-shaped transparency spread with the
largest e¤ect at longer maturities to the theory of discretionary disclosure, where
rms hide information that would adversely a¤ect their long-term outlook.
Liquid CDS contracts are highly desirable when studying the determinants of
the shape of the credit curve. As opposed to corporate bonds, this allows us to
study multiple maturity observations for a given rm at a given day, and maturities
24Including the maturity-matched constant maturity treasury yield in addition to the slope
implies that both are estimated insignicantly. However, coe¢ cients and signicance of the
transparency gap are unchanged.
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are equal across rms and xed through time. Furthermore, technical e¤ects are
known to impact the slope of the credit curve for corporate bonds trading o¤
par. Hence, ndings based on CDS spreads are likely to be more reliable than
studies based on corporate bonds. Our study shows that the term structure of
transparency spreads is downward-sloping in the CDS market across alternative
econometric specications.
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A Du¢ e & Lando (2001)
The setup and results on optimal capital structure and default are close to Leland
(1994) and Leland & Toft (1996). The rms assets V are modeled as a geometric
Brownian motion, which is dened on a xed probability space (
;F ; Q) : More
specically, V (t) = exp(Z(t)) where
Zt = Z0 +mt+ Wt; (7)
for a standard Brownian motion W , a volatility parameter  and a parameter m




= m+ 2=2: (8)
The rm generates cash ow at the rate Vt at time t and issues debt to take
advantage of the tax shields o¤ered for interest expense at the tax rate . The
debt is modeled as a consol bond with a constant coupon rate C. Hence, the
tax benets are C until default, where  2 [0; 1] of the asset value is lost as a
frictional cost. All agents in the model are risk-neutral and discount cash ows at
a constant market interest rate r.
The rm is operated by its equity owners, who are completely informed at all
times on the value of the assets V and choose when to liquidate the rm.25 The
default time is chosen endogenously by the equity owners to maximize the value
of equity, and is given as the rst time (VB) = infft : Vt  VBg the asset value
falls to the default barrier
VB (C) =










The resulting equity value is
S(V;C) =
V
















25This means that the equity owners have the information ltration (Ft) generated by V; where
Ft is the -algebra generated by fVs : 0  s  tg:
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while the value of the consol bond is
d (V;C) =
















Finally, the optimal coupon is chosen such that the initial total value of the
rm S(V;C) + d (V;C) is maximized.
After issuance, bond and CDS investors are not kept fully informed on the
status of the rm. They do understand that equity owners will force liquidation
when the asset value falls to VB, but they cannot observe the asset process V
directly. Instead, they receive an accounting report at selected times t1; t2:::; ti < t
in terms of a noisy estimate of the asset value given by bVt, where log bVt and log Vt
are joint normal. Specically,
Y (t) = log bVt = Z(t) + U (t) ; (13)
where U (t) is independent of Z(t) and normally distributed with mean u =  a2
2
=
E (Ut) and variance a2 = V ar(Ut): Hence, the standard deviation a of Ut measures
the degree of accounting noise. Also observed at each t is whether the rm has
defaulted or not. For simplicity, it is assumed that equity is not traded in the public
market and equity owners are precluded from trading in the credit market.26
Based on the information available, it is possible for the investors to calculate
the conditional distribution of assets Vt. With the simple case of having observed
only a single noisy asset report at time t = t1, the density g ( j Yt; z0; t) of Zt can
be computed conditional on the noisy observation Yt, a lagged noise-free report z0
and  > t. With ey = y    u, ex = x   and ez = z0  , where log(VB) = , the
density is shown to be






































26Hence, the information ltration in the credit market is dened as Ht =

 
Y (t1) ; ::::; Y (tn) ; 1f(VB)sg : 0  s  t
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and  is the standard normal distribution function. Conditional on survival up
to time t, this density gives us the conditional distribution of assets as g(V )=V ,
depicted in Figure 1. The conditional survival probability q(t; s) = Q ( > s j Ht)




(1   (s  t; x  )) g (x j Yt; z0; t) dx: (20)
 (s  t; x  ) at time t denotes the probability of the rst passage of a Brown-
ian motion with drift m and volatility parameter  from an initial condition
(x  ) > 0 to a level below zero at time s. This probability is known as
1   (s  t; x  ) (21)
= 
 


















A.1 Pricing the CDS
A CDS is an insurance contract against credit events such as the default on a
corporate bond (the reference obligation) by a specic issuer (reference entity).
In case of a credit event, the seller of insurance is obligated to buy the reference
obligation from the protection buyer at par. For this protection, the buyer pays a
periodic premium to the protection seller until the maturity of the contract or the
credit event, whichever comes rst. Since the accrued premium must also be paid
if a credit event occurs between two payment dates, the payments t nicely into a
continuous-time framework.
















where c denotes the annual premium known as the CDS spread, T the maturity
of the contract, r the risk-free interest rate,  the default time of the obligor and
27
EQ denotes the expectation under the risk-neutral pricing measure. Assuming





P (0; s)q(0; s)ds, (23)
where P (0; s) is the price of a default-free zero-coupon bond with maturity s, and
q(0; s) is the risk-neutral survival probability until time s at the time of issuance,
derived in equation (20).













where R is the recovery of bond market value measured as a percentage of par
in the event of default. Maintaining the assumption of independence between the





P (0; s)q0(0; s)ds, (25)
where   q0(0; t) =  dq(0; t)=dt is the probability density function of the default





P (0; s)q(0; s)ds+ (1 R)
Z T
0
P (0; s)q0(0; s)ds, (26)
and hence
c(0; T ) =  (1 R)
R T
0
P (0; s)q0(0; s)dsR T
0
P (0; s)q(0; s)ds
. (27)
As mentioned, the model assumes a constant interest rate r, implying that







Integrating the denominator by parts yields









q0(0; s) is found by di¤erentiating equation (20) inside the integral. To ease
notation, we denote b = x   , g (x) = g (x j Yt; z0; t) and t = 0, implying that a
noise-free report is received one period before. Since g (x) does not depend on s,
we only need to di¤erentiate 1   (s; b) with respect to s yielding

















=  f(x; s); (30)
where f(x; s) is the rst hitting time density of a Brownian motion with drift m
and volatility parameter . Therefore,
q0(0; s) =  
Z 1

f (x; s) g(x)dx; (31)
and hence Z T
0













e rsf (x; s) dsdx;
again since g (x) does not depend on s: The inner integral
R T
0
e rsf (x; s) ds is the
integral of a discounted rst hitting time density known from Reiner & Rubinstein
(1991) and Leland & Toft (1996) in closed form as
G(x; T ) =
Z T
0
e rsf (x; s) ds (33)
= exp (( c+ z) b)  (h1 (T )) + exp (( c  z) b)  (h2 (T )) ;
where























In the end, to calculate the CDS spread we only need to evaluate a single
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integral numerically

















B The Accounting Transparency Measure
The basic idea in Berger et al. (2006) is that when pricing equity, investors per-
ceive a rms permanent earnings as a geometrically weighted average of reported
earnings and industry average earnings. Investors put more weight on the rms
reported earnings when the accounting transparency is high.
Denote eEj;t as investors perception of rm j0s permanent earnings in year
t, Ej;t as the rms reported earnings and EI;t as the industry average earnings.
Scaling the earnings by rm asset Aj;t and industry assets AI;t, the permanent












where  2 [0; 1] is the weight put on rm-specic information. Taking logarithms
and rst-order di¤erences yields






















represents the rms share of the
industry assets. Assuming this share does not change much from year t   2 to
t  1, we approximately have
ej;t = ej;t + (1  ) eI;t: (41)
The equity price Pj;t is determined by investorsperception of permanent earn-
ings, and with the assumption of a constant cost of capital j and a constant
30





Hence, a rms equity return equals its permanent earnings growth rate rj;t =ej;t, implying that the idiosyncratic variance of the return must equal the idio-
syncratic variance of the perceived permanent earnings. Idiosyncratic is dened
relative to the industry, and the following relations between rm and industry
returns and between rm and industry earnings, respectively, are assumed
rj;t = ej;t = r + rI;t + "rj;t (43)
ej;t = a
e + beI;t + "
e
j;t: (44)
Finally, using equations (41), (43) and (44), the idiosyncratic variance of the per-




and the measure of accounting transparency  is calculated as the idiosyncratic
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Accounting Transparency
This table reports summary statistics for the accounting transparency measure developed
in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section 3. Panel A represents statistics
when pooling the measure across rms and years, while panel B displays statistics after
averaging the measure in the time-series for each rm. In panel A, N denotes the number
of rm-years with su¢ cient data to calculate the accounting transparency measure and
with associated CDS data. In panel B, N denotes the number of unique rms.
N Mean Std.dev. Min 25% 50% 75% 99% Max
Panel A. Statistics on the pooled transparency measure
890 0.50 0.61 0.00 0.16 0.29 0.60 3.23 5.65
Panel B. Statistics on the time-series average transparency measure
368 0.50 0.57 0.01 0.16 0.30 0.62 2.84 4.44
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Major Variables
This table reports averages of key variables across rms and time. The statistics are
presented across the senior unsecured credit rating from Standard & Poors. The 5-year
spread represents the overall spread level and is averaged over rms and end-of month
observations. The volatility is calculated at month-end using 250-days of historical equity
returns. The associated leverage is total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities
and equity market capitalization. The accounting transparency measure is developed in
Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section 3. NR means not rated.
5yr spread Volatility Leverage Transparency
AAA 23 0.29 0.28 0.92
AA 26 0.28 0.21 0.88
A 48 0.33 0.34 0.60
BBB 128 0.36 0.49 0.40
BB 392 0.49 0.61 0.39
B 658 0.74 0.76 0.20
NR 137 0.33 0.31 0.66
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Table 3: Average Correlations Among Major Variables
This table reports the Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cients between the major vari-
ables. The correlations are calculated each month, and the resulting average correlations
are reported. The volatility is calculated at month-end using 250-days of historical equity
returns. The associated leverage is total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities
and equity market capitalization. The accounting transparency measure is developed
in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section 3. The senior unsecured credit
ratings from Standard & Poors are transformed to a numerical scale, where rms rated
AAA are assigned the highest number, AA the next highest and so forth.
5yr spread Volatility Leverage Transp
Volatility 0.57
Leverage 0.62 0.25
Transp. -0.11 -0.08 -0.16
Rating -0.76 -0.41 -0.55 0.16
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Table 4: Summary Statistics by Credit Rating and Maturity
This table illustrates the distribution of month-end CDS quotes across credit ratings and
maturities. The mean consensus quote across time and rms is found in the rst row
for each rating category, while the number of observations and the mean relative quote
dispersion are found in the second and third row, respectively. The latter is calculated
as the standard deviation of collected quotes divided by the consensus quote. Panel
A reports the statistics for unrestricted curves, while Panel B reports statistics for full
curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years.
1yr 3yr 5yr 7yr 10yr Total
Panel A. Unrestricted curves
AAA 24 25 25 33 38 29
34 59 92 66 45 296
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
AA 24 24 26 29 35 28
146 264 351 297 226 1,284
0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
A 45 44 48 52 59 50
1,177 1,930 2,136 1,856 1,658 8,757
0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11
BBB 131 126 128 127 131 128
1,732 2,568 2,736 2,365 2,234 11,635
0.13 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10
BB 419 407 392 390 368 395
449 702 757 559 567 3,034
0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
B 761 712 658 613 615 672
66 82 87 76 70 381
0.12 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
NR 142 137 137 184 183 154
31 53 55 35 38 212
0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09
Total 141 136 133 129 139
3,635 5,658 6,214 5,254 4,838
0.13 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.11
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Table 4: Summary Statistics by Credit Rating and Maturity (cont.)
This table illustrates the distribution of month-end CDS quotes across credit ratings and
maturities. The mean consensus quote across time and rms is found in the rst row
for each rating category, while the number of observations and the mean relative quote
dispersion are found in the second and third row, respectively. The latter is calculated
as the standard deviation of collected quotes divided by the consensus quote. Panel
A reports the statistics for unrestricted curves, while Panel B reports statistics for full
curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years.
1yr 3yr 5yr 7yr 10yr Total
Panel B. Full curves
AAA 33 44 54 56 61 49
18 18 18 18 18 90
0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
AA 28 35 39 41 46 38
94 94 94 94 94 470
0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12
A 48 55 60 63 69 59
893 893 893 893 893 4,465
0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
BBB 133 140 143 144 146 142
1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 7,140
0.13 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.10
BB 428 425 413 403 390 412
342 342 342 342 342 1,710
0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10
B 690 690 668 642 626 663
50 50 50 50 50 250
0.12 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
NR 210 219 219 231 222 220
12 12 12 12 12 60
0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
Total 148 154 155 155 157
2,837 2,837 2,837 2,837 2,837
0.13 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.11
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Table 5: Estimation of the Term Structure of Transparency Spreads
This table reports the results of monthly cross-sectional regressions when estimating the
gap between high and low transparency CDS spread curves. The coe¢ cient estimates
are averaged in the time-series. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on
the standard error in Fama & MacBeth (1973). d is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
transparency measure developed in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section 3
in a given year ranks above the median score. mT is a variable that attains a value equal
to the CDS contract maturity T . The regression coe¢ cient in front of the product dmT
can be directly interpreted as the transparency spread. The volatility is calculated using
250 days of historical equity returns, and leverage is total liabilities divided by the sum
of total liabilities and equity market capitalization. Quote dispersion is the standard
deviation of collected quotes divided by the consensus quote. Full curves are a restricted
set of curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. The monthly
regressions are Spreadit = 1tm1it+2tm3it+3tm5it+4tm7it+5tm10it+6tdm1it+
7tdm3it + 8tdm5it + 9tdm7it + 10tdm10it + 11tV olit + 12tLevit + 13tQdispit + "it:
*, ** and *** denote signicance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unrestr. Unrestr. Full curves Full curves
m1 -293.64*** -299.10*** -315.01*** -333.24***
(-11.21) (-12.78) (-11.48) (-13.84)
m3 -292.11*** -297.06*** -312.26*** -328.17***
(-11.17) (-12.66) (-10.78) (-12.54)
m5 -293.64*** -297.26*** -316.80*** -328.18***
(-10.87) (-11.94) (-10.82) (-12.00)
m7 -296.34*** -300.50*** -315.20*** -328.85***
(-10.74) (-11.87) (-10.36) (-11.74)
m10 -295.43*** -300.12*** -311.45*** -327.26***
(-10.37) (-11.55) (-9.90) (-11.44)
dm1 -22.66*** -22.35*** -23.56*** -24.31***
(-4.22) (-4.11) (-3.91) (-4.29)
dm3 -20.04*** -19.98*** -20.52*** -20.94***
(-6.58) (-6.44) (-3.57) (-3.67)
dm5 -13.15*** -13.24*** -17.61*** -18.18***
(-5.56) (-5.54) (-3.11) (-3.21)
dm7 -12.88*** -13.05*** -14.67** -15.78***
(-5.98) (-5.75) (-2.71) (-2.82)
dm10 -10.94*** -10.82*** -13.08** -14.06**
(-5.26) (-5.21) (-2.47) (-2.59)
Volatility 805.44*** 805.59*** 873.06*** 874.86***
(16.50) (16.53) (12.92) (12.99)
Leverage 317.20*** 318.99*** 315.71*** 321.00***




Table 6: Estimation of the Term Structure of Transparency Spreads for
High and Low Risk Firms
This table reports the results of monthly cross-sectional regressions when estimating the
gap between high and low transparency CDS spread curves. The coe¢ cient estimates
are averaged in the time-series. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on
the standard error in Fama & MacBeth (1973). d is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
transparency measure developed in Berger, Chen & Li (2006) and calculated in section 3
in a given year ranks above the median score. mT is a variable that attains a value equal
to the CDS contract maturity T . The regression coe¢ cient in front of the product dmT
can be directly interpreted as the transparency spread. The volatility is calculated using
250 days of historical equity returns, and leverage is total liabilities divided by the sum
of total liabilities and equity market capitalization. Quote dispersion is the standard
deviation of collected quotes divided by the consensus quote. Full curves are a restricted
set of curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. The monthly
regressions are Spreadit = 1tm1it+2tm3it+3tm5it+4tm7it+5tm10it+6tdm1it+
7tdm3it + 8tdm5it + 9tdm7it + 10tdm10it + 11tV olit + 12tLevit + 13tQdispit + "it:
Each month, the rms are separated into high and low leverage and volatility groups by
the respective medians. The regression is then performed for each group. *, ** and ***
denote signicance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Lev. Low Lev. High Vol. Low Vol. High-High Low-Low
m1-m10 supp. supp. supp. supp. supp. supp.
dm1 -28.52*** -13.31* -33.45*** -2.91 -50.91*** -9.32***
(-3.38) (-1.96) (-3.11) (-1.21) (-3.88) (-2.81)
dm3 -34.21*** -2.01 -25.56*** -7.57*** -40.21*** -5.95***
(-5.90) (-1.26) (-4.24) (-4.38) (-4.02) (-3.30)
dm5 -22.69*** -1.44 -14.06*** -7.07*** -23.05*** -4.71**
(-5.64) (-0.78) (-2.77) (-3.92) (-2.97) (-2.69)
dm7 -21.51*** -3.75* -11.70* -5.15*** -22.35** -5.72***
(-4.29) (-1.98) (-1.85) (-4.10) (-2.52) (-3.13)
dm10 -14.44*** -5.97** -7.22 -5.47*** -14.61* -6.18***
(-3.22) (-2.40) (-1.32) (-3.73) (-1.73) (-2.88)
Volatility 979.19*** 338.10*** 1045.61*** 242.07*** 1150.61*** 200.79***
(14.08) (11.95) (12.61) (8.72) (10.75) (12.86)
Leverage 473.62*** 171.83*** 423.95*** 122.31*** 582.42*** 109.80***
(8.15) (11.15) (11.78) (10.64) (7.98) (13.54)
Qdisp -78.90 -177.14*** -22.81 -235.41*** 11.49 -145.59***

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: The Term Structure of Transparency Spreads and the Yield
Curve
This table estimates the gap between the high and low transparency CDS curves under
various econometric specications. (1) is a pooled OLS regression with White errors,
while (2) and (3) control for residual dependence by estimating cluster-robust errors
by curves and time, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parantheses. The senior
unsecured credit ratings from Standard & Poors are transformed to a numerical scale,
where rms rated AAA are assigned a score of 10, AA a score of 9 and so forth. The slope
of the yield curve is the di¤erence between the 10 and 1-year constant maturity treasury
rates. Panel A displays the results for unrestricted curves, while Panel B displays results
for full curves with an observation at a maturity of 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. The regressions
are Spreadit = 1tm1it+ 2tm3it+ 3tm5it+ 4tm7it+ 5tm10it+ 6tdm1it+ 7tdm3it+
8tdm5it + 9tdm7it + 10tdm10it + 11tV olit + 12tLevit + 13tQdispit + 14tRatingit +
15tSlopeit + "it: *, ** and *** denote signicance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Panel A. Unrestricted curves Panel B. Full curves
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
White Cluster Cluster White Cluster Cluster
m1-m10 supp. supp. supp. supp. supp. supp.
dm1 -15.48*** -15.48*** -15.48*** -13.93** -13.93** -13.93***
(-2.70) (-2.75) (-2.77) (-2.30) (-2.35) (-3.16)
dm3 -11.60*** -11.60*** -11.60*** -9.02* -9.02* -9.02**
(-3.05) (-3.23) (-3.20) (-1.72) (-1.78) (-2.13)
dm5 -6.27** -6.27** -6.27** -6.22 -6.22 -6.22*
(-2.05) (-2.14) (-2.37) (-1.33) (-1.38) (-1.72)
dm7 -4.68 -4.68 -4.68** -3.76 -3.76 -3.76
(-1.43) (-1.49) (-2.05) (-0.84) (-0.87) (-1.10)
dm10 -2.89 -2.89 -2.89 -1.50 -1.50 -1.50
(-0.91) (-0.95) (-1.23) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.42)
Volatility 649.90*** 649.90*** 649.90*** 682.60*** 682.60*** 682.60***
(32.52) (19.57) (9.56) (35.31) (17.12) (7.99)
Leverage 263.51*** 263.51*** 263.51*** 270.80*** 270.80*** 270.80***
(43.31) (22.04) (10.83) (34.71) (15.91) (10.58)
Qdisp 94.90*** 94.90*** 94.90** 75.96** 75.96 75.96
(4.18) (3.09) (2.29) (2.25) (1.54) (1.13)
Rating -49.38*** -49.38*** -49.38*** -57.97*** -57.97*** -57.97***
(-37.37) (-20.74) (-13.66) (-35.79) (-16.72) (-13.58)
Slope -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.65*** -0.65*** -0.65***
(-22.26) (-11.09) (-3.19) (-18.99) (-8.89) (-2.82)
Cluster - Curve Month - Curve Month

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Conditional Asset Density
The gure illustrates the conditional asset density for varying accounting precisions,
reproducing the base case in Du¢ e & Lando (2001). The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility
 = 0:05, risk-free rate r = 0:06, drift m = 0:01, payout ratio  = 0:05 and default cost
 = 0:3. The coupon rate C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78. A noise-free
asset report V (t   1) = V^ (t   1) = 86:3 is assumed together with a current noisy asset
report V^ (t) = 86:3. The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 and
measures the degree of accounting noise.
54
Figure 2: CDS Spreads for Varying Accounting Precisions
The gure illustrates the CDS spreads associated with the conditional asset densities for
varying accounting precisions, reproducing the base case in Du¢ e & Lando (2001). The
tax rate  = 0:35, volatility  = 0:05, risk-free rate r = 0:06, drift m = 0:01, payout ratio
 = 0:05, default cost  = 0:3 and recovery rate R = 0:5. The coupon rate C = 8:00 and
the default barrier V B(C) = 78. A noise-free asset report V (t  1) = V^ (t  1) = 86:3 is
assumed together with a current noisy asset report V^ (t) = 86:3. The standard deviation
a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 and measures the degree of accounting noise.
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Figure 3: CDS Spreads For a Low Leverage Firm
The gure illustrates the CDS spreads for varying accounting precisions in Du¢ e &
Lando (2001). A higher current and lagged asset report are assumed, capturing a lower
leverage ratio. The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility  = 0:05, risk-free rate r = 0:06, drift
m = 0:01, payout ratio  = 0:05, default cost  = 0:3 and recovery rate R = 0:5.
The coupon rate C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78. A noise-free asset
report V (t  1) = V^ (t  1) = 90:0 is assumed together with a current noisy asset report
V^ (t) = 90:0. The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 and measures
the degree of accounting noise.
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Figure 4: CDS Spreads For a Low Volatility Firm
The gure illustrates the CDS spreads for varying accounting precisions in Du¢ e &
Lando (2001) for a rm with low volatility. The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility  = 0:04,
risk-free rate r = 0:06, drift m = 0:01, payout ratio  = 0:05, default cost  = 0:3 and
recovery rate R = 0:5. The coupon rate C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78.
A noise-free asset report V (t  1) = V^ (t  1) = 86:3 is assumed together with a current
noisy asset report V^ (t) = 86:3. The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and
0:25 and measures the degree of accounting noise.
57
Figure 5: CDS Spreads For a Higher Initial Firm Level
The gure illustrates the CDS spreads for varying accounting precisions in Du¢ e &
Lando (2001). The current asset report is at its base case level, while the lagged asset
report is higher. The tax rate  = 0:35, volatility  = 0:05, risk-free rate r = 0:06,
drift m = 0:01, payout ratio  = 0:05, default cost  = 0:3 and recovery rate R = 0:5.
The coupon rate C = 8:00 and the default barrier V B(C) = 78. A noise-free asset
report V (t  1) = V^ (t  1) = 90:0 is assumed together with a current noisy asset report
V^ (t) = 86:3. The standard deviation a is assumed at 0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 and measures
the degree of accounting noise.
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